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Enactive approaches foreground the role of interpersonal interaction in explanations
of social understanding. This motivates, in combination with a recent interest in
neuroscientific studies involving actual interactions, the question of how interactive
processes relate to neural mechanisms involved in social understanding. We introduce
the Interactive Brain Hypothesis (IBH) in order to help map the spectrum of possible
relations between social interaction and neural processes. The hypothesis states that
interactive experience and skills play enabling roles in both the development and current
function of social brain mechanisms, even in cases where social understanding happens
in the absence of immediate interaction. We examine the plausibility of this hypothesis
against developmental and neurobiological evidence and contrast it with the widespread
assumption that mindreading is crucial to all social cognition. We describe the elements
of social interaction that bear most directly on this hypothesis and discuss the empirical
possibilities open to social neuroscience. We propose that the link between coordination
dynamics and social understanding can be best grasped by studying transitions between
states of coordination. These transitions form part of the self-organization of interaction
processes that characterize the dynamics of social engagement. The patterns and
synergies of this self-organization help explain how individuals understand each other.
Various possibilities for role-taking emerge during interaction, determining a spectrum of
participation. This view contrasts sharply with the observational stance that has guided
research in social neuroscience until recently. We also introduce the concept of readiness
to interact to describe the practices and dispositions that are summoned in situations of
social significance (even if not interactive). This latter idea links interactive factors to more
classical observational scenarios.
Keywords: social interaction, enaction, participatory sense-making, autonomy, transitions in coordination,
readiness to interact, interactive brain hypothesis
INTRODUCTION: CHANGING SOME BACKGROUND
ASSUMPTIONS IN SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
Research in social neuroscience has started to move away from
its almost exclusive focus on the individual brain as a detached
interpreter of social stimuli (see e.g., Van Overwalle, 2009) and
to pay attention to neural mechanisms involved in embodied
social interaction (Schilbach et al., 2006; Tognoli et al., 2007;
Lindenberger et al., 2009; Dumas et al., 2010; Redcay et al., 2010;
Pfeiffer et al., 2011). As a result, a series of fundamental ques-
tions concerning the function of the brain in social understanding
become apparent. One option that is opened by investigating
complex processes of social interaction is that brains might bear
less of a cognitive load than assumed in modular and individ-
ualistic explanations of social cognition based on mindreading
(the individual attribution and meta-cognitive processing of the
“mental states” of others). This is due to the well-documented fact
that processes of social interaction are complex, multi-layered,
self-organizing, and can shape individual intentions, orient indi-
vidual perception and guide the performance of individual action
(Marsh et al., 2009; De Jaegher et al., 2010; Riley et al., 2011). A
consequence of this is that the brain is potentially less involved in
reconstructing or computing the “mental state” of others based
on social stimuli and more involved in participating in a dynam-
ical process outside its full control, thus inviting explanatory
strategies in terms of dynamical concepts such as synergies, coor-
dination, phase attraction, (meta)stability, structural stability,
transients, and stationarity, etc.
We articulate the tension between this possibility and conser-
vative mindreading accounts by introducing the Interactive Brain
Hypothesis (IBH), which is aimed at broadening the spectrum of
possible explanations in social cognition research. As we shall see,
the IBH is an overarching assumption from which different spe-
cific hypotheses may be derived. Its main contrasting perspective
is the currently dominant assumption that gives priority to pro-
cesses of mindreading. While the focus on mindreading has been
criticized on various fronts, the alternatives have yet to coalesce
into a well-defined research program. We believe that the IBH
contributes to this end by developing an alternative set of starting
assumptions for social cognition research.
Our proposal is framed within the enactive approach to life
and mind. With roots in work by Francisco Varela and colleagues
(Varela et al., 1991), this approach has seen a major theoretical
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development since the turn of the century (e.g., Di Paolo, 2005;
Thompson, 2007). The main focus in this approach is the liv-
ing body, its autonomy as a self-organizing system, its precarious
identity and its sense-making relation to the world (Di Paolo
et al., 2010). As such the approach is nourished by dynamical
systems concepts and by phenomenology, as well as ecologically
plausible experiments and agent-based modeling work. For social
cognition research, the central implications of this approach
have been developed in the concept of participatory sense-making
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher, 2009), which breaks
with several assumptions about social cognition, such as the spec-
tatorial, individualistic view of the social cogniser or the hidden
nature of intentions. In this perspective, interpersonal interaction
dynamics play a central explanatory role in social understanding
and this is what will be emphasized in this paper. The claims that
we make here about the roles of interaction processes and indi-
vidual mechanisms in social understanding are part of the larger
theory of participatory sense-making (which includes several key
elements apart from interaction, such as emergence, autonomy,
agency, sense-making, and subjective experience) and should be
considered in that context.
A premise of the enactive approach is that cognition is not
exhaustively determined by neural processes (De Jaegher et al.,
2010) but implies the embeddedness of such processes in a liv-
ing body and the embeddedness of this body in a world. Having
said that, we hasten to emphasize that the enactive approach is
not an externalist perspective on cognition. Externalism, often
contrasted with neuro-centric internalism, proposes that cogni-
tive processes are to be found outside the brain and even the
organism, and that intentions acquire their full meaning only
when such external factors are taken into account. The enactive
approach emphasizes the inherent relational nature of cognition
and while it rejects neuro-centrism, it also sees the externalist
position as wanting because merely pointing to external depen-
dencies fails to articulate what makes a relation between agent
and world meaningful or a process cognitive. Instead, enac-
tivism conceives of cognitive agents as participants who enact
a world, not as passive data collectors who model or represent
the world. The key difference is in how the agent/world rela-
tion is explicitly or implicitly conceived. Because the enactive
approach sees cognitive processes as inherently relational, and
agents primarily as participants, it considers it crucial to eluci-
date different aspects of this relation, including what goes on
in individual brains as a result of it. Our aim in this paper is
to project this overarching framework onto the plane of neuro-
science and explore implications for the study of brain processes
in the context of intersubjectivity. If interaction processes are cen-
tral to explaining social cognition, then how do we understand
the neural mechanisms active during social engagements or social
tasks? Our goal is to help promote and develop research on this
question. We propose the IBH in the spirit of raising a series
of questions and indicating research paths, which if taken will
lead to specific interactive hypotheses about neural processes in
concrete instances of social cognition. Our aim, therefore, is to
describe the conceptual and empirical justification for the IBH,
link it to debates in psychology and neuroscience, and explore its
implications.
We have previously argued that social interaction can play roles
in social cognition that aremore than contextual. By this we mean
that interaction dynamics are not data to be decoded and stored
by information-processing mechanisms. Rather, the dynamical
processes of interaction are complex and can themselves enable
socio-cognitive performance or even be a constitutive part of it
(De Jaegher et al., 2010—see Herschbach, in press, for a critical
discussion of these claims). Such cases of social understand-
ing enabled or constituted by interactive processes can be used
to question the widespread assumption that subpersonal “min-
dreading” mechanisms fulfill a predominant role in all of social
cognition (what we describe below as the priority of mindreading
stance).
The IBH goes further than this questioning, but as an open
overarching hypothesis, not a claim. It proposes that social
interaction processes play enabling and constitutive roles in the
development and in the ongoing operation of brain mechanisms
involved in social cognition, whether the person is engaged in an
interactive situation or not. Accordingly, when an individual inter-
acts with others, the interaction processes would not function
merely as perceptual input to ready-made mechanisms but they
would also play a role in shaping those mechanisms. The IBH
proposes that the neural mechanisms involved in social under-
standing acquire and sustain their current functionality thanks
to past and present engagements in social interaction. In other
words, the IBH states that the function of the neural mechanisms
involved in social understanding is derivative of the functions
of neural mechanisms used in skillful social interaction. It is
derivative in the sense that the practice of interaction has forged
social understanding mechanisms during development, allow-
ing them to acquire functions that they would otherwise not
have, and also in the sense that those mechanisms are in fact
a specialization of brain mechanisms used during skillful inter-
action. This general hypothesis can be translated into specific
forms when we consider particular mechanisms, performances,
and contexts. It is conceivable even for different competing spe-
cific interactive hypotheses to fall within the broader assumptions
of the IBH.
The proposal should not be interpreted as negating the exis-
tence of a kind of mindreading as a cognitive performance. We
acknowledge that interaction is not always present and that peo-
ple sometimes need to reflect on the behavior of others. Our
position is that such reflective performances are not at play always
or in general, not that they do not exist or are unimportant.
We propose a hypothesis about the origins and function of the
mechanisms involved in these and other forms of social under-
standing. We believe that reflective stances are likely to involve
higher level mechanisms and are built upon a variety of embodied
skills, including interactive ones, as the IBH proposes.
As hypotheses go, we acknowledge this is a bold one. However,
ideas that point in this direction have been suggested before. For
instance, Schilbach and colleagues hypothesise that the develop-
ment of “mentalising” (reasoning about the attributed “mental
states” of others) is a function of the “dynamic interplay of social
interactions in which the contents of mental states (of oneself or
an other) are experienced via quasi automatic attunement to oth-
ers.” This attunement “may then constitute a basic and primary
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form of intentionality which predisposes the dyadic nature also
inherent in more detached mental representations” (Schilbach
et al., 2006, pp. 727–728). The presence of a “dyadic nature” in the
activity of detachedmindreading, i.e., even when the other person
is not in direct engagement with us, comes as no surprise to pro-
ponents of constructivist and/or (neo-)Vygotskyan or Meadian
approaches to the development of theory of mind (ToM) in chil-
dren (Garfield et al., 2001; Carpendale and Lewis, 2004; Symons,
2004; Fernyhough, 2008; Stone et al., 2012). For these approaches
it is the degree of socialization during development that best pre-
dicts the child’s capacity for social understanding. Garfield et al.
(2001, p. 496) put the claim in no uncertain terms: “the devel-
opment of language and the development of a set of social skills
are prior to, jointly causally sufficient, and individually causally
necessary for the acquisition of ToM, in contradistinction both to
strongly modular theories of the genesis of ToM and ‘theory the-
ory’ accounts.” Indeed, a large amount of evidence points to the
importance of the quantity and quality of linguistic engagements
at home and with peers for ToM capacities (Milligan et al., 2007).
The IBH attempts to express what these perspectives imply for
neural processes. One prediction is that the influence of linguistic
social engagements could be manifested differentially in neu-
ral activity during social understanding depending on language
and cultural background, which is what the evidence suggests
(Kobayashi et al., 2007). Similar shaping roles for proto- or non-
linguistic social engagements have been proposed to drive the
development of shared attention (Racine and Carpendale, 2007),
understanding the attention of others, and self-conscious emo-
tions (Reddy, 2003, 2008). More generally, even very early forms
of pro-social behavior, such as the maturing of babies’ vocaliza-
tions in terms of syllabic structure and faster consonant-vowel
transitions, are shaped by social interaction involving contingent
emotional feedback by their carers (Goldstein et al., 2003).
The IBH thus fits within a view of social brain function that
is neither pre-given nor fully unshaped, and a view of the social
world that is notmerely a data content for individual cognition. In
line with a recent proposal, the IBH sees the brain primarily as an
organ of relation (Fuchs, 2011) and less as an organ of detached
cognizing. Humans are pre-disposed to engagement in interac-
tions that include the material and social world (e.g., Trevarthen,
1979; Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001; Tucker and Ellis, 2001), which
plastically (re-)shape the functionality and structure of the brain.
From the IBH perspective we could make better sense of the evi-
dence of the plasticity of the adult humanmirror system (Catmur
et al., 2007; Heyes, 2010), which is not buffered against radical
reconfiguration even after relatively small amounts of training.
Or similarly of the evidence indicating that perspective-taking in
a visual ToM task can be improved after sensorimotor training
in which participants are asked not to imitate a finger movement
stimulus, thus suggesting that inhibiting imitation responses in
one task can transfer to better capabilities to take the point of view
of the other in a different task (Santiesteban et al., 2012). Adult
socio-cognitive mechanisms’ susceptibility to improvement or
reconfiguration depending on experiences that are readily avail-
able in everyday interactions gives support to the idea that these
mechanisms not only develop but also sustain their functionality
in part through participation in social interaction.
Sections “Why Should Neuroscience Take Social Interaction
(More) Seriously?”, “The Interactive Brain Hypothesis”, and
“Examining the Evidence” of this paper are dedicated to exam-
ining the background of the IBH, its formulation and plausibility.
Section “Towards a Neuroscience of Social Interaction” addresses
different challenges that must be faced for investigating the IBH.
In particular, we focus on the challenge of studying social inter-
action as a dynamical process. We break down the complexity of
social interaction into relevant components that may be investi-
gated empirically as independent or dependent variables. These
aspects include dynamical transitions in coordination patterns,
synergistic effects of interactional autonomy, the emergence of
roles and dispositions to interact.
WHY SHOULD NEUROSCIENCE TAKE SOCIAL
INTERACTION (MORE) SERIOUSLY?
Social cognition has traditionally been defined as “information
processing in a social setting” (Frith, 2008, p. 2033) and consid-
ered the result of a linear process starting from social stimuli,
turning them into perceptions of the social world, leading to
decisions, and followed by actions (Frith, 2008, p. 2033). Until
recently, little attention has been paid to more realistic and
widespread scenarios where this linear picture breaks down, i.e.,
where persons are involved in ongoing, multi-modal sensorimo-
tor loops at various timescales and in addition these loops are
modulated by coupling with the sensorimotor loops of other per-
sons. Not only do actions, perceptions and decisions mutually
depend on one another, and often happen concurrently within a
single individual, but they also interconnect with the actions, per-
ceptions and decisions of others. Similarly, it is also often implied
that social information processing is at the basis of all aspects of
social interaction from the basic (see e.g., Blakemore and Frith,
2004; Frith and Frith, 2007) to the most sophisticated (Forbes
and Grafman, 2010). In this view, social information processing
is what allows us to share a social world. Again, the link seems to
be questionably unidirectional.
In order to examine the relation between social understand-
ing and social interaction, it is useful first to make a small detour
to introduce the distinction between a cognitive performance and
the mechanisms that support it. Among other things, cognition
involves an engagement of the full agent with the world involv-
ing intentions, actions, perceptions, affect, and meaning. This
engagement at the personal level should be conceptually distin-
guished from the subpersonal mechanisms involved, much in the
same sense that winning a car race is not the same as having a
powerful engine (see Dennett, 1969; Bennett and Hacker, 2003).
In this paper we intend this distinction in a pragmatic sense that
will help us formulate our hypothesis.
Mechanisms may bear a variety of relations to cognitive per-
formance. Some processes in the agent and in the environment
may bear no relation to performance at all, others may be merely
contextual, i.e., they introduce variations in the outcome with-
out determining the result (e.g., changes in lighting conditions
can affect how efficiently we solve a jigsaw puzzle). Others may
enable performance, i.e., without them it would not be possible.
These may be historical (e.g., having learned to manipulate the
pieces of the puzzle, to group them together according to some
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 163 | 3
Di Paolo and De Jaegher The interactive brain hypothesis
strategy) or contemporaneous (e.g., being in possession of an
adequate perceptual system capable of distinguishing shapes and
colors). Among the enablingmechanisms, we tend to isolate those
that seem to have a higher relevance for the task (e.g., matching
complementary patterns in shape and color seems more rele-
vant to solving jigsaw puzzles than the capability to move the
pieces around). But the question of which mechanism is more
crucial for cognitive performance is often answered intuitively
and the distinction is not always well grounded (grouping pieces
together according to color or shape can in fact be as important as
matching patterns). Answering this question well requires always
a careful characterization of the object of investigation and the
structure of its context (e.g., what alternative explanations we care
about or how we can intervene in practice to alter the results,
Garfinkel, 1981). An explanandum that is not well described leads
to confusing explanations.
Having established the distinction between performance and
mechanisms, we can now examine the current situation in social
cognition research. Social cognition has been almost exclusively
limited to some version of mindreading, i.e., to the interpre-
tation of the intentions of another person. Mindreading as a
performance has in turn been almost exclusively conflated with
mechanisms in the individual brain in the form of computa-
tional modules postulated to be in charge of interpreting social
stimuli and inferring the intentions of the other, assumed as not
directly perceivable (Baron-Cohen, 1995). This general view is
what we describe as the priority of mindreading stance. We may
question first whether social cognition, in the larger sense of effec-
tive performance involving not only social understanding but
also action and affective experience in social situations, must be
based exclusively on mindreading. We may, separately, also ques-
tion whether mindreading itself, as a performance, must be based
exclusively on individual brainmechanisms that implement some
form of subpersonal “interpreting,” “simulating” or “inferring”
(see Gallagher, 2008a). In other words, we question both (1) the
centrality of mindreading and (2) the mapping of the structure of
performance onto the function of neural mechanisms.
To make sense of these two questions and explore how things
could be otherwise, we must first do something that is not
often done: say what we mean by social interaction. We define
social interaction as the autonomous engagement that can emerge
between two or more autonomous agents who are mutually reg-
ulating their dynamical coupling. We here mean coupling in a
dynamical systems sense: i.e., two systems are said to be coupled
when parametrical and other structural descriptions of the laws of
transformation of states in one of them have a functional depen-
dence on the state variables of the other, which may be non-linear,
piece-wise state-dependent, and time-varying (in which case we
call the coupling “dynamical”). Coupling can be unidirectional
or mutual. When we speak about cognitive agents in interaction,
the basis for such a coupling can take various shapes and involve
various perceptual systems, sensorimotor flows, neural, and phys-
iological processes, external objects, and technological mediation.
Notice that we use the word “autonomous” to describe both the
agents and their engagement. Autonomy here is meant in the
operational sense used in the enactive literature, involving a self-
maintaining organization (for technical definitions see De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007). As such, social interaction goes beyond the
mere co-presence, or even the mere dynamical coupling between
agents. It requires that the processes of co-regulation of such
a coupling become self-sustaining. This definition allows us to
make sense of everyday situations where interaction seems to
“take a life of its own” in spite of the individual intentions of
the participants, and sometimes to their own frustration. This
happens through synergistic effects (see, e.g., Kelso, 2009a,b)
at the level of individual actions and intentions involving rela-
tional bodily variables, such as relative positions and timing
between movements, coordination between perceptual systems,
and neuro-physiological variables. Such effects can be uninten-
tional, for instance, in the narrow corridor situation when people
walking in opposite directions become stuck trying to get past
each other, arguments that cannot seem to be avoided, telephone
conversations that linger on after having already said goodbye,
escalations in intensity of utterances or antagonistic actions, and
so on.
This definition impacts on howwe conceive social understand-
ing. In developing the enactive approach to intersubjectivity, we
have argued that the processes that make up interactive dynam-
ics can be described as processes of coordination, breakdown, and
recovery of coordination between the participants at various lev-
els: physiological, bodily, affective, cognitive, etc. (De Jaegher and
Di Paolo, 2007). We have proposed that such processes have com-
plex relations to social understanding. In particular, individual
“mental states” (those that “do” the understanding and those
to be understood) are not fully independent or fully established
prior to the interaction, but are instead affected, negotiated, and
even created as a result of interaction dynamics. We describe this
set of possibilities, much broader than social cognition based on
mindreading, as participatory sense-making. Everyday social inter-
actions do not bear out that social situations consist in figuring
out the “mental states” of others, where these states are hid-
den, pre-existing, unaffected by the interaction, owned by each
individual participant and opaque to the other.
Thus, by defining social interaction in operational terms and
tapping into the wider notion of social understanding that is given
in everyday experience, we propose a negative answer to the ques-
tion of whether social cognition as a performance must be based
on mindreading (question 1). It must not and alternatives exist.
Considering social cognition in the light of participatory sense-
making allows us to relax the assumptions of linear processing,
individual cognitive load, and pre-given, hidden “mental states”
that might make mindreading the main factor of social cognition
if they were true. Understanding in a social situation can happen
through a variety of possibilities, mindreading being only one of
them (and according to phenomenological critiques, not even the
main one, see Gallagher, 2008a,b, in press).
In addition, we also respond in the negative to the question
of whether social cognition as a performance, even mindreading,
must be based on subpersonal computational versions of “min-
dreading” instantiated in brain processes (question 2). The mech-
anisms of social understanding, enactively construed, involve
being engaged in the dynamics of interaction. Collective, rela-
tional, and normative social processes instantiated during interac-
tions can play enabling roles in socio-cognitive performance, and
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even be a constitutive part of such performance, as recent exper-
iments in perceptual crossing have demonstrated (Auvray et al.,
2009; De Jaegher et al., 2010, see also Auvray and Rohde, in press;
Lenay and Stewart, 2012). As interactions are studied empirically,
such possibilities can be put to the test in order to measure to
what extent engagement with others can more parsimoniously be
an explanans and not always the explanandum.
This does not mean that all social understanding must be
done in actual social interaction—this would also contradict our
everyday experience. Neither does it mean that, in some circum-
stances, a reflective capacity of some kind, conceived of at the level
of performance, is not a valid hypothesis. What remains open
is how interaction and these mechanisms relate in such cases.
The neural mechanisms presumed to be involved in mindreading
scenarios might work differently in interactive situations—most
likely not by performing tiny subpersonal inferences or simula-
tions in homuncular fashion. More even, interaction may affect
such mechanisms in a more than contextual manner. And even
more strongly, we may raise the question of whether social neural
mechanisms might not be primarily interactive in origin and func-
tion, and it is only as a special case that they are put to the task of
mindreading. These possibilities will be the basis of the IBH.
THE INTERACTIVE BRAIN HYPOTHESIS
The IBH is concernedmainly with the brainmechanisms of social
understanding. It is formulated with the aim of contributing to
experimental social neuroscience but its more general implica-
tions also help us re-think social understanding as an act that
depends on interactive elements.
The IBH helps landmark an outpost in the logical space of pos-
sible explanations in social neuroscience. It describes an extreme
possibility, namely that all social brain mechanisms depend on
interactive elements either developmentally or in the present,
even in situations where there is no interaction. This may turn
out to be true only in some cases, or even in none.
The IBH comes in two versions:
Developmental (DIBH): The functions of individual brain
mechanisms involved in social understanding have been
shaped during development by skillful engagements in social
interactions where interactive processes have been involved in
social performance in a more than contextual way.
Contemporaneous (CIBH): Even in the absence of immediate
interaction, the functions of brainmechanisms enabling social
understanding are derived contemporaneously from functions
used primarily in skillful social interactions where interactive
processes are involved in social performance in a more than
contextual way.
In both versions, the IBH concerns the functionality of indi-
vidual neural mechanisms and their role in social understanding.
The IBH is not a hypothesis about performances.
We use the term contextual in the sense indicated in Section
“Why Should neuroscience Take Social Interaction (More)
Seriously?” For interactive processes to be involved in cognitive
performance in at most a contextual way means that their role
in the outcome is one of “data”: i.e., the most we can establish
is that variations in interactive factors introduce variations in
outcome of the cognitive performance without affecting its func-
tionality. To play more than a contextual role means that the
interactive elements are more than data and become enabling
(necessary) factors in determining not only the outcome but also
the functionality of the processes underlying performance. The
hypothesized involvement of interactive factors, both develop-
mentally and contemporaneously, in shaping or sustaining neural
mechanisms involved in social understanding is thus not trivial
(as it would have been if we were concerned with merely con-
textual influences on the performance outcome introduced by
aspects of interaction).
To avoid misinterpretations, it is important to emphasize what
the IBH does not say. It does not claim that individual brain
mechanisms play no important role in social understanding, even
during engaged social interactions. On the contrary, it is con-
cerned with the interactive origins and aspects of the functioning
of neural mechanisms, because it recognizes them as essential.
The involvement of these mechanisms in the explanation of
various socio-cognitive phenomena is always something to be
determined case by case rather than assumed a priori as is usually
done. Neither does the IBH suggest that among the developmen-
tal precursors or among the current functional components of
a given neural mechanism involved in social understanding we
will find only interactive elements as enabling or constitutive fac-
tors. Several non-interactive factors and functional elements will
undoubtedly also be required for the explanation of the function-
ality of brain mechanisms in social cognition. The IBH simply
makes the non-trivial proposal that among the necessary fac-
tors, we will always find some enabling or constitutive interactive
elements.
Let’s consider the context for the IBH. As we mentioned,
we denote the assumption that some form of mindreading has
priority over all forms of social cognition as the priority of
mindreading stance. In particular, this position holds “that min-
dreading facilitates interaction rather than the other way around.
On this view, mindreading has priority in the logic of how we
interact with others; we first observe, then infer the other’s beliefs,
and only then, on this basis, engage in interaction” (Gallagher,
in press). This follows the staged view that we have mentioned
at the beginning of Section “Why Should Neuroscience Take
Social Interaction (More) Seriously?”: “Signals arising from the
environment impinge upon us. Sensations [. . . ] are turned into
perceptions [. . . ]. Then, decisions are made about what should
best be done in response to these perceptions [. . . ]. Actions are
planned and finally output is initiated in the form of motor
movements [. . . ]. Within this general framework of stimulus
and response, we can have a subset of processes concerned
with social stimuli (e.g., reading facial expressions), social deci-
sions (Should I trust this person?) and social responses (making
facial expressions)” (Frith, 2008, p. 2033). This position is sel-
dom argued for explicitly and yet it is uncritically adopted very
often. It can be found in the opening lines of many studies
adopting the passive observer’s view: “To successfully navigate
the social world, we need to decode a dynamic stream of com-
plex information [to] infer other humans’ mental states, such as
desires, intentions, emotions, and thoughts” (Wolf et al., 2010,
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p. 894). “Understanding and predicting other people’s mental
states and behavior are important prerequisites for social inter-
actions” (David et al., 2008, p. 279). In spite of the observational
stance adopted by the experimental evidence supporting the min-
dreading perspective (e.g., false-belief tests), “theory theorists
have always emphasized that the primary use of mindreading is
in interaction with others” (Carruthers, 2009, p. 167).
The position relies on an argument by default: “there is simply
no other way (than using theory-driven computations of under-
lyingmental states) of explaining our competence in this domain”
(Carruthers, 2009, p. 47). The position also implies a representa-
tionalist view according to which mutual understanding involves
the sharing of hidden “mental representations” (without attempt-
ing to specify what they are): “For successful interactions [we]
need to share representations of the world” (Frith and Frith,
2007, p. R727). “Human social interactions crucially depend on
the ability to represent other agents’ beliefs even when these
contradict our own beliefs, leading to the potentially complex
problem of simultaneously holding two conflicting representa-
tions in mind” (Kovács et al., 2010, p. 1830). The priority of
mindreading stance also sees interaction as a discrete chain of
informational exchanges subserving the goal of passing “repre-
sentations” “from transmitter to receiver” (Singer et al., 2003,
p. xxii).
Given that, in sharp contrast to this picture, dynamic, concur-
rent, multi-timescale, and non-staged social interaction processes
can sometimes be shown to be the main explanatory factor for
social cognitive performance with no mindreading involved (see
Auvray et al., 2009; De Jaegher et al., 2010) and that not all of
social understanding involves sharing “representations” of hidden
“mental states” (Gallagher, 2008a, in press), the priority of min-
dreading claim is demonstrably false. However, the stance may
still survive as a general heuristic for research.
The purpose of the IBH is to investigate the alternative possi-
bility that neural mechanisms subserving and shaped by interac-
tion have (developmental and/or functional) priority over those
subserving mindreading. The DIBH states that having the capac-
ity to interact with others skilfully and having (perhaps specific)
experiences of interaction is necessary for the development of
all kinds of social cognition, without putting any conditions on
the kind of individual mechanisms involved during acts of social
cognition in the present. The CIBH states that, whatever the
developmental path taken, neural mechanisms supporting social
cognition in the present functionally depend on mechanisms
that are used during interactive engagement also in the present;
in other words, social cognition, including non-interactive min-
dreading, makes crucial use of interactive mechanisms. Both
versions question the priority of mindreading.
It would be possible for the DIBH to be true without the CIBH
being true. The developmental paths that lead to brain mecha-
nisms involved in social understanding could depend crucially
on interactive experiences and yet the mechanisms themselves
could function in the present without involving interactive ele-
ments. And the opposite is also the case, at least logically: the
CIBH could be true without the DIBH being true. Social cog-
nition mechanisms in general could always involve mechanisms
that are used in interactive situations, only that their development
has not depended crucially on having undergone interactive expe-
riences where interaction plays more than a contextual role. In
other words, this would describe a situation in which the function
of socio-cognitive mechanisms, all of them involving interactive
elements, has not been shaped by past interactions (i.e., interac-
tive experiences have played at most a contextual role as data).
Admittedly, this possibility seems less plausible and would involve
a strictly nativist perspective. It is not so controversial to claim
that at least some aspects of how we engage with others are
developed precisely as we perfect the skill of interacting in actual
encounters, and that the corresponding individual mechanisms
are shaped accordingly. If this is accepted, then holding the CIBH
true also implies accepting the DIBH. In practice, the CIBH is the
stronger of the two versions.
The IBH in both its forms is open to empirical scrutiny and
falsifiable. Given that social understanding can have multiple
components, it is also possible to distinguish general and partic-
ular versions of the IBH. The general version holds the IBH true
of all forms of social understanding. The particular version con-
cerns the role of interactive mechanisms in specific capabilities
(e.g., understanding at different levels the actions of others, their
beliefs, their expressions, their goals, their relations to others,
their personality traits, taking the other’s perspective, etc.).
EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE
Is there any evidence supporting the plausibility of the IBH?
Let’s consider the extreme case where the hypothesis would seem
least applicable: non-interactive mindreading. The question of
the developmental and operational relation between mechanisms
that support mindreading and those that support skillful inter-
action is very much under-studied. The majority of research is
concerned with mindreading capabilities outside interactive con-
texts and in so far as mechanisms are discussed, research in
cognitive psychology or social neuroscience is mostly focused on
postulating functionality based on computational requirements
(e.g., social contingency detection modules, Gergely and Watson,
1999), or based on localization of neural activation in the absence
of interaction.
Certain neural and developmental evidence hints at the plau-
sibility of the IBH, without being conclusive. A few studies
have indicated that different neural circuits seem to be acti-
vated depending on the presence or absence of specific interac-
tive elements, such as situations of conflict, being addressed, or
elicitations to interact. Such elements seem to modulate “inter-
pretational” mechanisms like those involved in mindreading. In a
study of monkeys with different levels of dominance in the social
hierarchy sharing a social space, Fujii et al. (2007) have found
differential activation in the parietal cortex, in circuits suppos-
edly involved in understanding the actions of others, according
to whether the configuration presents a conflict of interests or
not. During imaging studies in humans using virtual characters,
Schilbach et al. (2006) have found that the interpretation of social
content in the stimuli relates specifically to the activation of the
ventral medial prefrontal cortex, whereas the experience of self-
involvement (present in interactive situations but not generally
in passive interpretation) recruits in addition neural activity in
a more dorsal part of the medial prefrontal cortex, which has
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been suggested to be involved inmore general tasks requiring self-
reference. And different imaging studies looking at the response
to stimuli that do or do not display an elicitation to interact, in
gestures (Lotze et al., 2006), vocalizations (Dietrich et al., 2007),
facial and bodily expressions (Lawrence et al., 2006), and visual
scenes (Tylén et al., 2009) also reported differential activation
in brain regions normally associated with verbal language when
communicative intent was apparent.
These studies suggest that the function of mechanisms
involved in observational social understanding is modulated
by the presence of interactive elements such as conflict in a
shared space, self-involvement or communicative intent. If this
evidence had been otherwise, then at first sight it might be
compatible with some version of the priority of mindreading
stance, given that the mechanisms used to interpret social stimuli
would have been unaffected by interactive elements. Indeed, the
unspoken reliance on this priority is apparent in interpreting
cases that show a coincidence of activation in brain regions
due to interactive stimuli (calls to attention involving the self
in observed gaze direction in static images or upon hearing
one’s own name) and mindreading (Kampe et al., 2003). The
fact that a coincidence has been found in this case between
interactive and mindreading neural circuits is readily seen as
evidence that we need to mentalise in order to understand social
stimuli like a gaze directed toward the self. The authors suggest
that: “mentalizing is involved in understanding the signals that
a sender emits to initiate communication with someone. It is
likely that we attribute mental states such as beliefs, desires, and
intentions to the sender while guessing the meaning of these
signals” (Kampe et al., 2003, p. 5262). However, the conclusion
is unwarranted since it is clear that the same evidence can equally
be interpreted in IBH terms, perhaps even more parsimoniously
as there is no experiential evidence that stimuli directed to the
self are accompanied by guesses about their meaning and “mental
state” attributions (Gallagher, 2008b, in press). Confronted with
this evidence, the IBH perspective would suggest that, on the
contrary, it is mindreading that recruits functionality which
is otherwise used in interactive contexts, such as, for instance,
understanding person-oriented attitudes in others based on our
own experience of having been the object of their attention.
It is clear, then, that activation of the same brain areas cannot
differentiate between the two interpretations (IBH and prior-
ity of mindreading). Evidence of differential activation between
interpretational and interactional situations is at least suggestive
of mindreading mechanisms not being necessarily involved or
not playing the same roles during interaction as they do dur-
ing detached interpretation. This evidence should moderate the
readiness to interpret data and design experiments putting min-
dreading first. The priority of mindreading, uncritically assumed
in the last example, is what the IBH questions and at least this
questioning is supported by evidence of differential activation.
However, such evidence by itself cannot count in favor of the
positive part of the IBH which establishes a priority for mech-
anisms that support interactive capabilities. For this, it would
have to be established that interaction is involved in shaping
mindreading mechanisms or that such mechanisms are a spe-
cialized case of interactive mechanisms also in situations where
interaction is absent. To the best of our knowledge such evidence
has not been produced so far and will have to wait for more
systematic investigation involving actual interactions as well as a
clear proposal in terms of the functional interrelation between the
mechanisms involved going beyondmere correlational activation.
Nevertheless, some existing support pointing in this direction
may be found by considering the developmental aspects of both
mindreading and interactive capabilities.
Evidence of mindreading in infants under 3 or 4 years of age is
still controversial in spite of recent studies indicating behavioral
and attentional sensitivities in false-belief situations indicating
violation of expectation or anticipated looking in infants as young
as 7–17 months of age (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Surian
et al., 2007; Song et al., 2008; Kovács et al., 2010; Southgate et al.,
2010—see Gallagher, in press for parsimonious behavioral and
enactive interpretations according to which this evidence does
not require “mental state” attribution). In contrast, the capa-
bility of infants to skillfully engage in affective, richly rhythmic
and intentional interaction from birth or very early in life has
been undisputed for some time (Bullowa, 1979; Trevarthen, 1979;
Murray and Trevarthen, 1985). This difference notwithstanding,
support for the IBH must be sought in the potential interactive
roots or nature of the postulated precursors for mindreading, as
we shall attempt next, and not simply in the fact that interactive
abilities appear earlier developmentally.
In what follows it is important not to understand the idea of
a precursor as a necessary stage in a developmental progression
that is later overcome and does not continue to play impor-
tant roles once more sophisticated skills have been established.
Instead a “precursor” may involve mechanisms that remain active
throughout the lifespan (Gallagher, in press).
One proposed precursor of mindreading, the capability to
understand the attention of others (Baron-Cohen, 1995), is
believed to be the result of the development of joint attention
toward the end of the first year. However, it has been argued
to have much earlier roots in the infant’s understanding of
the other’s attention directed toward the self during interaction
(Reddy, 2003). Infants of about 2 months of age are able to
respondwith smiles or coyness and becomemore expressive when
adults make eye contact with them, and show the opposite emo-
tional responses when adults stop attending. By 4 months, they
attempt to engage the adult’s attention with vocalizations and by
initiating “games.” After 6 months, infants are able to specifically
regulate their responses with respect to the attention others give
to their actions, engaging in exaggerated performances to attract
attention, eliciting praise, laughter and challenging the expecta-
tions of others by teasing them. As Reddy argues, the infant’s
grasp of the relation between the other’s gaze and the object of
visual attention is enabled by their intimate experience of hav-
ing been themselves the object of the other’s attention in the
past. This experience happens in interaction (see also Reddy and
Morris, 2004; Reddy, 2008). Similarly, in an extensive review of
the literature on the development of shared attention, Racine
and Carpendale (2007) conclude that capacities such as point-
ing and social referencing are evidenced in interactive shared
practices earlier than the infant’s purported understanding of oth-
ers’ “mental states.” The developmental evidence identifies the
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practices that are shaped through the infant’s interactions with
others, in particular in their affective engagements, as prior to
the development of shared attention. However, as Racine and
Carpendale recognize, this identification does not explain how
interactions shape these capacities, which is what research into
the IBH could help uncover.
Another proposed precursor for mindreading is the capabil-
ity for imitation (Meltzoff and Moore, 1998). Although imitation
in infancy remains the topic of ongoing debate (see Hurley and
Chater, 2005a,b for representative positions; also Ray and Heyes,
2011), in the context of the IBH it is interesting to note that
imitation has primarily been discussed in terms of motor-based
accounts of how we understand the goal-directed actions of
others to produce our own. The IBH would predict that such
accounts are likely to involve mechanisms whose functionality has
been shaped during interaction (Froese et al., in press). Recent
evidence indeed suggests that mirror system functionality in
humans is forged by experience. Catmur et al. (2007) have shown
that the mirror system in adults is easily re-adjusted plastically to
produce “counter-mirror” responses after training with incom-
patible sensorimotor stimuli. This demonstrates that the human
mirror system is highly plastic (effects were measured after three
training sessions lasting 45min each)—(see also Catmur et al.,
2008, 2009, 2011).
The plasticity of the mirror system responses is in itself not
unexpected. They depend on such factors as the level of perfor-
mance skill in the actions being observed, as shown in the case
of ballet dancers (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006), the use of chop-
sticks (Järverläinen et al., 2004) and other tools (Ferrari et al.,
2005). However, it could be claimed that the effect of experi-
ence on mirror neurons is merely contextual according to our
definition (the intensity of neural responses co-varies with the
intensity of experience, e.g., the amount of training). But the data
of Catmur and colleagues indicates a stronger role for experi-
ence. One would expect for incompatible experience to at most
diminish the strength of mirroring responses, not to reverse their
“meaning” after a short training (i.e., not, as in their case, for
the observation of a foot-lift to elicit motor responses associated
with lifting the hand). This indicates that sensorimotor experi-
ence functionally re-shapes the mirror system, thus playing an
enabling role in determining its involvement in social cognition.
These results give support to claims that the mirror system is
the outcome of associative learning involving correlated obser-
vation and execution of actions either through spatio-temporal
contiguity (Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Del Giudice et al., 2009)
or through sensorimotor contingency (Heyes, 2001, 2010). The
proposal would seem to remain plausible even in the light of
counter-arguments involving evidence of newborn imitation (Ray
and Heyes, 2011). If fulfilling a functional role, the plasticity
of mirror responses is suggestive of a system able to adapt to
social engagements that are potentially changing rapidly. This
would imply that, to function effectively, such mechanisms are
constantly being adjusted by interactive experience.
Does this evidence support the IBH? The experience necessary
for enabling the development of “mirror” mechanisms is clearly
available in the social world of the infant. What is not immedi-
ately clear is whether this experience is primarily interactive or
merely observational. Evidence points in the interactive direction.
The behavioral effects of counter-mirror training are stronger in
the presence of contingency between stimulus and action than in
cases that also involve a neutral, non-contingent stimulus (Cook
et al., 2010). This indicates that the most likely and reliable source
of experience shapingmirror function are situations of social con-
tingency involving close links between observations and actions,
i.e., situations of social interaction. Not only this, but interactive
situations in combinationwith the associative learning hypothesis
can also explain the development of “mirror” responses demand-
ing complementary actions (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007).
These are likely to bemore present than imitative action matching
in general, and increasingly so as the infant develops what we call
a readiness to interact (Section “Towards a Neuroscience of Social
Interaction”) and interactions acquire more complexity.
As a point of clarification, we repeat that the IBH does not
claim that non-interactive factors play no role in the development
of socio-cognitive neural function. As such, while it gains sup-
port from the associationist perspective on “mirror” responses,
the IBH is not immediately contradicted by counter-hypotheses
based on evidence of mirror activity very early in life (Lepage
and Théoret, 2007; Gallese et al., 2009). The IBH can accom-
modate these alternatives, as long as they indicate not a nativist
position, but the otherwise undisputed presence of pro-social
pre-dispositions in utero. And even then interactive factors are
not easily discarded. For instance, in a study of twin pregnan-
cies, Castiello et al. (2010) have found that the kinematic profiles
of limb movements already at the 14th week of gestation is dif-
ferent depending on whether they are aimed at the wall of the
uterus or at the other twin and that the proportion of movements
directed at the sibling increases in the following weeks. While the
authors suggest that this is evidence of a “pre-wiring” for social
interaction, the evidence is inconclusive. The role of interactive
experience cannot be easily discounted even in this case; after all
there is another twin alsomoving and touching the self. Moreover,
the increase of movements directed toward the sibling may indi-
cate the presence of interactive learning (a pre-wired mechanism
would predict an equal intensity from the start).
As regards the developmental evidence, what matters is
whether interactive experience plays a forging, enabling role—but
not necessarily a fully determining one—in shaping the function-
ality of socio-cognitive neural mechanisms. It is not necessary,
then, to interpret the IBH in an externalist way, but rather as
describing a dialectical scenario involving social dynamics in the
cognitive-emotional development and sustaining of social under-
standing. In this scenario, interactive experience and the mech-
anisms involved in interaction co-develop with non-interactive
mechanisms. They mutually shape each other’s development and
efficacy, resulting in an integrated set of social skills that could not
have existed without interaction.
TOWARD A NEUROSCIENCE OF SOCIAL INTERACTION
The complexity of social interaction makes its study poten-
tially very rich, but also methodologically challenging. The pat-
terns and structures of social interaction have long been the
focus of numerous studies in social psychology (Kendon, 1990),
sociology (Goffman, 1963, 1967; Garfinkel, 1967), conversation
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analysis (Sacks et al., 1974; Goodwin, 1981), psychiatry and
psychotherapy (Bateson et al., 1956; Watzlawick et al., 1967).
Though perhaps not immediately applicable, a lot of the accu-
mulated expertise in these fields will still be very relevant for
studies of interaction in social neuroscience. Particularly relevant
are studies of dynamical patterns in interpersonal coordination
(Richardson et al., 2007; Marsh et al., 2009; Shockley et al., 2009;
Riley et al., 2011), joint action (Sebanz et al., 2006), mother infant
interaction (Bullowa, 1979; Trevarthen, 1979; Jaffe et al., 2001)
and agent-based computational modeling (Di Paolo, 2000; Quinn
et al., 2003; Di Paolo et al., 2008; Froese and Di Paolo, 2010).
Social interaction is “a co-regulated coupling between at least
two autonomous agents, where: (1) the co-regulation and the
coupling mutually affect each other, constituting an autonomous
self-sustaining organization in the domain of relational dynam-
ics and (2) the autonomy of the agents involved is not destroyed
(although its scope can be augmented or reduced)” (De Jaegher
et al., 2010, p. 442–443). Social interaction is a complex dynami-
cal pattern of different forms of coordination between the activity
of two or more agents mutually affecting each other. Accordingly,
the most challenging aspect of studying interaction in controlled
experiments is its unpredictability, rendering it seemingly more
amenable to naturalistic observation and analysis. Nevertheless, it
is possible to identify aspects of interaction that can be empirically
manipulated in systematic ways. Here we review some of them.
COORDINATION TRANSITIONS
Interpersonal coordination can happen at the level of bodily
movement (Richardson et al., 2007; Marsh et al., 2009; Shockley
et al., 2009, etc.), posture (Varlet et al., 2011), physiological vari-
ables, such as heart rates and breathing patterns (McFarland,
2001; Müller and Lindenberger, 2011), autonomic responses
(Ebisch et al., 2012), and EEG patterns (Tognoli et al., 2007;
Lindenberger et al., 2009; Dumas et al., 2010; Naeem et al.,
2012). It happens spontaneously and sometimes, as expected
from the autonomy of social interaction, even against the indi-
vidual intention not to coordinate (Schmidt and O’Brien, 1997;
Issartel et al., 2007). Coordination may involve the performance
of similar movements (rocking chairs, tapping) or the timing
of more complex actions, not necessarily similar to each other
(Newman-Norlund et al., 2007; Riley et al., 2011). Interestingly,
it may also be aperiodic, as in the case of two people reading
from a text together (Cummins, 2011). It may be absolute (perfect
entrainment) or relative (more inconstant and fluid distribution
of variables over time exhibiting coherence and phase attraction).
A case of relative coordinationwould be an adult and a child walk-
ing together at the same speed despite their natural differences in
stride length (Kelso, 1995).
From the enactive perspective, in which we create and trans-
form meaning together (we participate in each other’s sense-
making), what is particularly interesting are transitions in coor-
dination. It is at the transitions, like coordination breakdowns
and recoveries, that our interactions take a different direction,
and we with it. This goes together with changes in individual
involvement, and in making sense of the situation. The differ-
ent ways in which these transitions can take place describe a
spectrum of possibilities for participating in sense-making. They
range from orientation of individual attention and affect to joint
sense-making where actions and intentions are co-constructed in
the interaction (rendering the interactor’s intentions anything but
opaque to each other).
In view of this, simply measuring coordination should not
be the end goal of interactive neuroscience. We propose that
a fruitful approach will be to study the transition patterns in
their relation to meaning, affect and intention, either as they
occur spontaneously or by experimental manipulation. In par-
ticular, not much data exist about the neural involvement and
effects that precede, co-occur and follow these transitions (as
opposed to periods of established coordination). The stability of
coordination patterns and their transitions can be studied exper-
imentally by introducing perturbations to the coupling between
the interaction participants and analysing the effects on social
understanding. Such perturbations may range from the manipu-
lation of noise and time delays along the channels of interaction,
to more sophisticated methods along the lines of Virtual Partner
Interactions (Kelso et al., 2009) or animated virtual characters
(Pfeiffer et al., 2011) where various parameters influencing cou-
pling strength may be varied. These kinds of investigation will
bear a direct relevance to the IBH because they will help iden-
tify the relation between aspects of the interaction and social
understanding and the corresponding role for brain mechanisms.
The empirical investigation of transitions in coordination can
be done via two kinds of approaches. Dynamically, transitions in
coordination can occur between coordination patterns and the
absence of coordination, or they may involve changes between
absolute and relative coordination. These qualitative differences
can be measured with traditional dynamical systems techniques
(Kelso, 1995, 2009a,b; Riley et al., 2011) as well as with measures
of long-term correlations able to reveal different qualities of inter-
action couplings (van Orden et al., 2003, 2005; Kello et al., 2010).
It is important to bear in mind the need to identify the relevant
collective variables or order parameters at a given level of descrip-
tion. In parallel, in terms of the significance in the interactive
context, transitions can involve changes in relation between the
interactors, for instance, changes from imitative to complemen-
tary action, or between symmetric and asymmetric roles. Dual
EEG (e.g., Dumas et al., 2010; Naeem et al., 2012) could be used
to explore these questions by measuring the fine temporal struc-
ture of neural events prior to and just after behavioral breakdowns
and the re-establishment of coordination.
Even in complex unconstrained interactions, coordination-
breakdown-recovery patterns and their relation to sense-making
can be studied, for instance, by measuring transitions in
non-verbal synchrony. Using motion energy analysis to study
inter-bodily synchrony in psychotherapy in over 100 recorded
interactions, Ramseyer and Tschascher (2011) have found that
high levels of non-verbal coordination correlate with patients
reporting good relationship quality and experiencing high self-
efficacy as well as higher symptom reduction as evaluated by the
therapist. Thermal IR imaging could track autonomic responses
in similarly unconstrained situations and our proposal can be eas-
ily adapted to verify whether trends in these therapeutic variables
are predicted by the amount of transitions in and out of bodily
and physiological synchrony.
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Coordination can be modulated through different dimensions
of an interaction. We find an example of this in the narrow
corridor situation, where two persons walking in opposite direc-
tions get stuck in a symmetrical situation in their attempts to
get past each other. The unintended coordination is sustained
at the level of body movements (moving left or right at the
same time). In order to get out of this unintended coordina-
tion they can wait until it spontaneously breaks down, or they
can try to unlock it from another level, so to speak, by inter-
vening with something like saying “after you” or a gesture to
that effect. Here, the spoken or gestural coordination intervenes
and breaks down the movement coordination. Indeed, it has
been found that non-social multimodal situations (involving pro-
prioception, touch and sound) induce a higher likelihood of
transitions in coordination (for instance, in the case of rhyth-
mic tasks, transitions between phase locking and phase drift)
(Lagarde and Kelso, 2006). Experimental designs that study mul-
timodal coordination can be adapted to interpersonal situations
in social tasks that involve different channels of sensorimotor
coupling.
AUTONOMY OF INTERACTION
During interaction, periods of coordination can orient individ-
ual attitudes, actions and intentions with a trend to sustaining a
relational configuration. In turn the configuration can facilitate
certain forms of coordination but not others. As a result, periods
of engagement can have a distinct dynamical signature and it is
at this point that interaction patterns can play important roles in
social understanding and coordinate and shape individual mech-
anisms. Not recognizing the point at which an interaction “gets
going” can lead to methodological problems. For instance, evolu-
tionary robotics models suggest that a plausible explanation of the
infant’s lack of interest in the delayed video image of her mother
in Murray and Trevarthen’s (1985) double TV monitor experi-
ment is the dynamical stability of the engaged interaction pattern
during the live condition (Di Paolo et al., 2008; De Jaegher et al.,
2010). Rochat et al. (1998) reported not being able to replicate
the original results, a failure that was likely due to the fact they
recorded the first minute of the live condition for use during the
replay whether or not engagement had been established. Allowing
engagement to develop in the live condition, however, leads to a
confirmation of the original findings (Nadel et al., 1999) as the
interactive explanation predicts. Simply putting participants in an
interactive configuration is no guarantee that a social interaction
will take place.
How to recognize and understand the effects of engagement?
One aspect of the self-organization of social interaction is the
presence of synergistic effects. These effects result from the rela-
tional configuration of attitudes, intentions, and actions of the
participants and may be promoted by the situation and past his-
tory of interactions. Their dynamical signature is often a reduc-
tion of dimensionality in the system (Kelso, 2009a; Riley et al.,
2011) and increased mutual predictability between inter-personal
variables. Such effects may or may not be in line with individual
intentions. It is often the case that participants are not aware of
such synergies and may misattribute the origin of these effects to
the other participants.
Examples of synergistic effects involve situations of escalation
(often found in arguments that recur to everyone’s frustration).
Force escalation is demonstrated in a simple interactive experi-
ment (Shergill et al., 2003). Participants are asked to activate in
turn a lever that produces pressure on the other person’s hand
with the same amount of force as perceived in the previous round.
Due to a systematic bias in underestimating one’s own force, par-
ticipants perceive the force exerted by the other as stronger and
respond by increasing their pressure in the next round, resulting
in an unwanted escalation.
Synergistic effects thus rely on individual mechanisms that
find themselves paired into self-sustaining, sometimes paradoxi-
cal relations. We already mentioned the narrow corridor situation
where the very act of trying to get past the person coming from
the opposite direction provokes simultaneous symmetrical moves
to the side resulting in the perpetuation of the configuration. Or
the rules of politeness that sometimes overcome the interactors’
individual intentions to end the interaction. A striking example
is the perceptual crossing experiment by Auvray et al. (2009, see
also Auvray and Rohde, in press). In this case, while the strategies
used by the participants in trying to discriminate virtual objects
controlled by the other are individually insufficient to solve the
task, their collective pairing achieves the intended result.
THE SPECTRUM OF PARTICIPATION
The self-organization of interaction has two sides depending on
whether we focus on the collective pattern or on an individual
participant. From the latter’s point of view, synergistic effects are
often experienced as demands for specific forms of participation
and the (not always intended) taking-up of specific roles. A key
aspect for neuroscientific research is that a participant is differ-
ent from an observer. A participant cannot fully control her own
flow and timing of perceptions and actions and has to respond to
demandsmade by the actions of other participants. Otherwise the
interaction breaks down. Of course, a participant also places con-
straints and demands on others, resulting in a situation of mutual
influence and co-adaptation. This is a very unusual situation
in terms of what has been investigated under the observational
paradigm (Van Overwalle, 2009).
Participation is rarely strictly symmetric and depends on social
context, task, norms, and history. Interactive roles (e.g., leader
and follower) may be pre-established, but it is often the case that
they emerge during interaction and vary at different points during
the engagement (together with transitions in modes of coordina-
tion). The emergence of roles does not require explicit channels
of meta-communication. In a study of haptically coupled coop-
erating dyads moving a heavy crank toward a target, Reed et al.
(2006) found that “dyads specialized such that one member con-
tributed more to acceleration and the other to deceleration” of the
movement (p. 366) without any interaction channel other than
the movement itself.
Even well defined roles (like a pre-established agreement on
who is going to lead) require subtle and ongoing mutual con-
firmation in the form of a sustained engagement. If the follower
cannot or will not follow, the leader’s role immediately vanishes.
The different possibilities ranging from pre-established fixed
roles, to emerging temporary or durable roles all the way to
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symmetrical situations mark what we call a spectrum of partici-
pation. Interactive situations can occupy different positions along
this spectrum and the quality of the interactive patterns will
depend on this (Konvalinka et al., 2010; Noy et al., 2011). Effects
on social performance and on the function of individual neu-
ral mechanisms are also likely to depend on this factor. In the
context of the IBH this suggests that studying interaction as an
element that could shape or involve individual neural mecha-
nisms for social understanding cannot be done without awareness
of the position within this spectrum of participation, which may
be manipulated or at least measured using statistical tools to
determine the influence between interpersonal variables.
READINESS TO INTERACT
Once we start taking social interaction seriously, it is possible
to interpret some evidence in terms of what we call a readiness
to interact. We characterize this as a disposition to engage or
participate in socially meaningful situations, which range from
perceiving a stimulus that presents another person (e.g., a por-
trait, a film, a voice on the radio), to full-blown interactions.
Dispositions to interact can result from previous interactions.
This is shown in finger tapping studies, where natural individual
frequencies for tapping in the absence of interaction are moved
closer together after a period of visual interaction involving syn-
chronized tapping (see Oullier et al., 2008–similar effects have
been found in evolutionary robotics models of social coordi-
nation, Di Paolo, 2000). Manifestations of readiness to interact
include expectancies of social contingencies and anticipatory dis-
positions during communication (Jordan, 2009), the “eye-contact
effect” by which perceived direct gaze from others modulates
socio-cognitive performance (Senju and Johnson, 2009), under-
standing the possibilities that fit the collective affect of a social
situation (like the “mood” of a meeting), or the embodied and
affective “pull” to respond that we experience when a direct
demand is made on us.
As a disposition elicited by a socially meaningful situation,
readiness to interact can play roles in social understanding analo-
gous to the role played by the mastery of the law of sensorimotor
contingencies in the sensorimotor theory of (non-social) per-
ceptual experience (O’Regan and Noë, 2001). Accordingly, the
possibilities for action afforded by an object and our bodies is
sedimented in dispositions that depend on how bodily movement
and sensation co-vary when the object is skilfully engaged with.
We directly perceive, for instance, the “meaning” of a cup’s han-
dle because it affords holding for raising the cup for drinking and
this perception results from past experience, our bodily structure,
and (often ignored in the sensorimotor approach), social and cul-
tural normativity. According to O’Regan and Noë, the elicitation
of these predisposed potentialities co-constitutes the perceptual
act together with the actual actions taken by the perceiver. In a
similar (though not identical) fashion, socially meaningful situa-
tions can be understood in terms of the potential for interactive
involvement they elicit, even in situations where such involvement
is not actualized.
Social understanding thus becomes intertwined with social
interactive skills (McGann and De Jaegher, 2009). Their mastery,
however, is subject to different laws than those of sensorimotor
engagement with an object. The co-variation of perception and
action in the social realm is regulated by at least two autonomous
agents, and so mastering the sensorimotor laws involved is likely
to require more flexibility than in the case of inanimate objects.
The difference lies in that objects can generally be perceptually
determined by sensorimotor engagement, whereas other persons
always remain to some extent indeterminable. It is precisely this
indeterminacy that help us recognize them as autonomous per-
sons. The mastery of the regularities in skillful interaction with
others comes from patterns of transitions in coordination that
leave amark throughout our interaction history.We want to high-
light that, since even the manipulation of objects is influenced by
socio-cultural normativity, it is likely that there is a continuum
of flexibility in “law-like” couplings, from how we engage with
objects to how we interact with other subjects.
Readiness to interact can contribute to explaining the devel-
opment of social understanding. In a study of false belief under-
standing in 2-year-olds, an experimenter put an interesting toy
in one of two containers on a high shelf (out of reach of the
child), either in the presence of his parent or in their absence
(O’Neill, 2005). It was found that when the parent was absent
while the toy was put away, upon her return the children named
the toy and its location significantly more often and gestured in
its direction more intensely when asking the parent to retrieve
the toy than when the parent had been present. Results like this
are often interpreted in terms of mindreading: the child infers
a knowledge state on the basis of a perceptual state, and this
informs his subsequent actions. However, these findings can also
be interpreted in terms of readiness to interact, which predicts
that the disposition to interact differs in each situation. In the
case where the parent has been absent, the infant has individu-
ally attended to the toy, and when the parent arrives, he can now
interact with the parent. What has to happen is for the child to
orient the parent’s sense-making toward the toy. This involves
vocalizations and gestures that extend his interactional possibil-
ities so that the parent finds the toy and gives it to him. In the
case where the parent is present during the putting away of the
toy, infant and parent have both and together attended to what
happened. They, therefore, experienced a disposition to interact
that already involved the object (the infant could potentially, as in
similar past situations, convey a desire to play with the toy and the
parent could bring it closer). The infant does not have to orient
the parent to the toy after it is hidden because both, in interacting
together, experience the change in the interaction potentialities as
the experimenter hides the toy. For this reason, the gestures and
vocalizations are less intense. This explanation does not involve
postulating hidden internal “mental states,” but is based on what
is available to each participant, namely their mutual attention,
what happens to the toy, and the interactive potentialities and
actualities that change in the situation. Similar enactive expla-
nations of very young infants’ response to false-belief situations
are given by Gallagher (in press). They involve, in our view, the
concepts of readiness to interact and of changing possibilities for
interaction.
An empirically relevant possibility that is raised by taking
readiness to interact into account is that dispositions vary not
only with the actual stimulus but with the potential interactive
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possibilities that the situation affords. Thus, observing a picture
of a person gazing at us is not the same as observing a real per-
son gazing at us. There is a difference in general in the intensity
of the readiness to interact in each case (the image is understood
as an image and so elicits a readiness to interact that is generally
less intense—though not fully absent—than observing a real per-
son who could actually, and not just potentially, be looking at us).
This could explain the differences in neural response to direct or
averted gaze when presented with a picture or with a live person
stimulus (Pönkänen et al., 2011) or the difference in discriminat-
ing between human and object movements when presented live
or via a TV screen (Shimada and Hiraki, 2006). The use of vir-
tual characters that may or may not be controlled by a real person
(Pfeiffer et al., 2011) could prove a useful technique for inves-
tigating variations in readiness to interact brought about by the
presence of interactive contingency.
Having emphasized that readiness to interact can be modu-
lated by the actual presence of an interactor, and in general by
the ecological and social significance of the experimental situa-
tion, it is worth noting that of the different interactive factors
mentioned so far, it is more amenable than others to being
investigated using the passive observer paradigm. Dispositions
to interact may be evidenced in the excitability of motor neu-
rons. In a recent study that we argue shows support for the IBH,
Sartori et al. (2011), have investigated how social context mod-
ulates corticospinal excitability indicating a covert disposition to
respond to a social gesture. Using transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion (TMS) and recordingmotor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in the
hand muscles of participants during the passive observation of a
video sequence, this study demonstrates two important aspects
of readiness to interact: (1) its contextually varying time-course
and (2) the significance of a pre-attuned social context. The video
sequence shows a person extending her arm to grasp either an
apple with the whole hand or an almond with a precision grip,
then moving the object to a plate and following this action by
extending the arm with an open hand toward the viewer. In some
cases, another object is present in the direction of the extended
hand but out of reach and the gesture can readily be interpreted
as asking the viewer to hand over the object (either an almond or
an apple). The amplitude of the MEPs in different hand muscle
groups indicates a disposition to imitate the observed grip dur-
ing the first part of the video (the grasping). This is followed,
when an out-of-reach object is present, by a disposition toward
executing the grip corresponding to the out-of-reach object in
the second part, in preparation to potentially handing the object
over. If instead of an outstretched arm, the viewer is shown an
arrow indicating the out-of-reach object (and no person in view),
the MEPs are significantly lower in amplitude than if shown the
social gesture, and not distinguishable from the case when the
objects are shown by themselves with no arrow. This suggests
that the change from imitative to complementary action dispo-
sitions is contingent on perceiving the social gesture toward an
object and not likely to be mediated by inferential mechanisms.
The latter would presumably act in a similar fashion in the pres-
ence of the arrow, a well-known indexical pointer (the action
admittedly would be understandable as “grasping” only given the
context of the experiment since the same participants were also
exposed to the outstretched arm request condition). Thus, the
result implicitly supports the IBH over a mindreading alternative.
The disposition to interact tracks the time-varying social and
ecological context and is strongly modulated by the pre-existing
social significance and sensitive to the potential for interactive
engagement. Readiness to interact, the result of previous inter-
active practice, parsimoniously explains the data in a situation
where inferential mechanisms, because they amount to cognitive
overkill, are unable to generate the differential effect. Based on
what we have suggested above, we can predict that the strength
of the disposition to interact, which increases when the stimulus
is changed from an arrow indicating an object to the image of
a request gesture for the same object, will further increase if the
gesture is made by a contingently animated virtual character or
indeed by a real person.
Readiness to interact can also be measured indirectly by look-
ing at interference effects when participants are instructed either
to perform imitative or complementary actions to those pas-
sively observed (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007; van Schie et al.,
2008). When the context of imitation or complementarity is dis-
rupted by a different cue (e.g., a number or a color indicating the
performance of one specific action, whatever the context), then
difficulty in responding to out-of-context commands can indicate
the strength of the disposition to perform the contextually sug-
gested action. However, unlike the study by Sartori et al. (2011),
the tasks performed in many of these studies rely less on socially
significant gestures and are likely to uncover dispositions that are
formed during the training and execution of the experimental
task itself.
Our readiness to interact with others connects interactive
experiences and skills on the one hand, and situations with a
social meaning on the other. Therefore, of the different interac-
tive factors we have mentioned in this section, it might bear most
directly on the dependence of social understanding mechanisms
on interactive elements postulated by the IBH. As we interpret
the behavior of someone we are observing but not interacting
with (e.g., a character in a film), we could, given the appropri-
ate circumstances, be in a situation where such an interaction
was possible. Readiness to interact marks our sensitivity to this
potentiality. Our dispositions in such cases are embodied, they
are sometimes even bodily felt, and can modulate our social
understanding. We conjecture that an enactive explanation of
reflective social understanding as a performance is likely to draw
significantly on the concept of readiness to interact.
Ideally, none of the aspects of interaction mentioned in this
section and their roles in social understanding should be stud-
ied exclusively in a one-person paradigm. Interactions should be
studied live using methodologies like hyperscanning or thermal
cameras that allow the simultaneous recording of neurophys-
iological activity during relatively unconstrained engagements.
However, manipulating interaction dynamics can still be method-
ologically challenging. For this reason, we would like to empha-
size that, at least in connection with the DIBH, the effects
of interactive experience on individual neural mechanisms can
also be investigated “after the fact” by more traditional com-
parative methods (for instance, applying the methods used by
Cook et al., 2010, but using interactive situations as training)
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and that several of the above aspects of interactions may be
approached in this manner.
CONCLUSION
Some recent discussions on embodied approaches to social
cognition have reduced the role of the body to that of for-
matting so-called neural “representations” although no effort
is made to clarify what this term could mean (Goldman
and de Vignemont, 2009; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011). Such
approaches remain neuro-centric and individualistic. In contrast,
the enactive approach foregrounds a different notion of the living
body (of which the brain is a part) in its ongoing sense-making
relation to the world. According to this approach, the brain is
understood as embedded, not in a protective and nourishing cas-
ing, but in ongoing circular processes of sense-making that pass
through it, the body and the world; in other words it is under-
stood as a mediating organ (Fuchs, 2011) with all the implications
that this view has for the study of brain function.
In the case of social understanding the human body lives in
the social world and among embodied others. The multiple phe-
nomena in this social world serve not just as the objects, but
also as the sustainers of different forms of sense-making and
modes of participation. The enactive approach does not neglect
the brain; it emphasizes the living body and the world of signifi-
cance that enable, shape and constrain brain function (Cosmelli
and Thompson, 2010). We have proposed the IBH as an attempt
to articulate these relations between world, body and brain for
the case of social understanding. Our focus has been on a concept
that mediates between all these elements: social interaction.
We have shown that until recently social interaction has been
neglected in mainstream social neuroscience in everything but in
name and that the majority of research in this field has adopted
the priority of mindreading stance. Consequently, to propose that
social interaction can play shaping or constitutive roles in social
understanding and, more strongly, to hypothesise that interactive
elements shape and may even constitute socio-cognitive neural
mechanisms is, in our opinion, far from trivial. The traditional
picture is turned on its head and the reflective performances
that were thought to be the fertile basis for all of social under-
standing are now recast as dependent on interactive skills and
mechanisms. We have indicated some of the empirical direc-
tions that derive from taking the IBH seriously. They include
investigating transitions in coordination, the autonomy and syn-
ergies of interaction patterns, the emergence of and transitions
between different modes of participation and the role of social
dispositions, skills and readiness to interact.
For reasons of space, in making the case for the IBH we have
focused on certain socio-cognitive phenomena (understanding
the actions of others) to the neglect of other important aspects.
Among these we can briefly mention social affect. Self-conscious
emotions, such as shame and guilt, make little sense in the absence
of the experience of the other as someone capable of recogniz-
ing us as autonomous agents (Reddy, 2008)—in analogy to the
act of giving, which cannot be completed by a single person
alone. Recognition is manifested in interactions, as are neglect,
admiration, desire, pity, love, and hatred. These affective phe-
nomena are not “carried” over the interaction channels, but are
themselves modes of the interactive experience of connectedness,
as well as ways in which interaction dynamics vary. They are
also a consequence of the dialectics of recognition and domina-
tion that emerge from the potential conflict between individual
autonomies at the heart of our definition of social interaction. To
the extent that this is the case, engaging with others is key to the
development and sustaining of our emotional lives (Benjamin,
1988).
Other areas that may benefit from investigating the IBH
include research into the social etiological aspects of psy-
chopathologies like schizophrenia (see Bateson et al., 1956;
Bateson, 1972; Brüne, 2003; Burns, 2006) and autism (Hobson,
2002), and the role of language and dialogical processes (includ-
ing implications for cognitive functions, such as planning and
formal reasoning) (Garfield et al., 2001; Carpendale and Lewis,
2004; Symons, 2004; Fernyhough, 2008).
Our focus on social interaction does not mean, to say it once
more, that we suggest that non-interactive factors play no impor-
tant role in explanations of social understanding. Our enactive
proposal is participatory and dialectical: there cannot be interac-
tion without individual participants whose roles, skills and higher
forms of autonomy and cognition could not exist without and are
shaped by social interaction.
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